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On 18 December 2014, the ECJ delivered its long awaited Opinion 2/13 on the
compatibility with EU law of the draft agreement for EU accession to the ECHR. The
ECJ concluded, to the great surprise of many, that the accession agreement is not
compatible with EU law. Indeed it found so many obstacles with the agreement that it
has now rendered accession very difficult, if not impossible.
For a long time, it has been considered expedient that the EU should accede to
the ECHR, in order to optimize its human rights protection. All EU Member States
are already Contracting Parties to the ECHR, and there are many advantages to
the EU itself acceding. First, a formal linking of the EU and ECHR could be seen
as underlining the EU’s concern for human rights, given that the ECHR is seen as
part of European cultural and political heritage. Second, the accession would finally
answer criticisms of double standards: that the EU requires accession of all Member
States but not, before Lisbon at least, of itself. Third, and crucially, EU accession to
the ECHR would alleviate the situation in which individuals find themselves when
faced by possible breaches of the ECHR by EU institutions. At present, unless EU
law has been implemented by some Member State act (in which case action would
be against that Member State) there is no possible action in Strasbourg. This leaves
a gap in judicial enforcement.
That being said, the ECJ concluded 2 decades ago in Opinion 2/94 that, under
the existing treaty provisions, there was no competence for what was then the
Community to accede to the ECHR. The Lisbon treaty remedied this by amending
Article 6(2) TEU to place an obligation on the EU to accede to the ECHR, and
accession proceedings were opened. The mandatory accession procedure, set out
in Article 218 TFEU, is cumbersome and complex. Nonetheless, in April 2013, a
draft agreement on accession was agreed between the Council of Europe and the
European Commission. Given that a number of member states – both from within
and outside the EU – initially had reservations about the terms of EU participation
in the Convention system, it is some achievement that agreement between them
was reached, albeit in a regrettably secretive process on the EU side, as the action
brought by Leonard Besselink for access to accession documents revealed.
However, the ECJ was also asked to provide an Opinion under Article 218(11)
TFEU, which provides for a special procedure whereby a member state, or major
EU Institution, may obtain the Opinion of the ECJ as to whether any agreement
envisaged by the EU is compatible with the treaties. Notably, despite the fact that
the three major EU institutions, as well as the EU’s 28 member states, submitted at
the Court hearing that the draft accession agreement was compatible with the EU
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treaties, the Court held that it is not. AG Kokott, in an Opinion delivered on 13 June
2014, had also found the agreement compatible with EU law, albeit in highly qualified
terms. Given the ECJ’s adverse holding, the agreement may not enter into force
unless it, or the EU treaties, is revised.
The Court’s reasoning in Opinion 2/13
Much of the Court’s Opinion considers the arguments made by EU Institutions and
Member States. Indeed, only just over one quarter of the judgement, about 8 web
pages, actually sets out the Court’s own position on compatibility of accession with
EU law. This posting will now briefly consider, in order, each of the arguments made
by the Court as to why, in its mind, accession would be incompatible with EU law.
First, and significantly, the Court was quick to point out that, to date, only States
have been members of the ECHR. The Court disparaged the approach adopted in
the draft agreement, which it believed treats the EU as a State, and thus ignored the
intrinsic nature of the EU. In contrast, the ECJ has characterized the EU as ‘a new
legal order’. Interestingly, in Opinion 2/13, the ECJ asserted that, under international
law, the EU is precluded by its very nature from being considered a State. While
such a clear statement may come as a relief to those who fear the growth of the EU
into a superstate, what follows in the Opinion amounts to a robust declaration of the
autonomy of EU law, which has some troubling consequences, and ultimately led the
ECJ to find the draft agreement incompatible with EU law. The Court structured the
remainder of its arguments under the following headings:
1. a) The specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU law
The autonomy of EU law, and its specific, sui generis nature, has been a running
theme throughout its legal history. EU Accession to the ECHR must therefore
not disturb EU competences nor the interpretive monopoly of the CJEU in the
interpretation of EU law, and Protocol 8 Lisbon treaty was drafted with this in mind,
specifically stating that the accession agreement must ‘make provision for preserving
the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law.’ The ECJ observed that,
while after accession, the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of the ECHR would bind
the EU, including the ECJ, nonetheless it would be unacceptable for the ECtHR to
call into question the ECJ’s findings in relation to the scope of EU law. The Court
cited 3 specific ways in which the draft agreement failed to take account of the
specific characteristics of EU law.
First, the ECJ was concerned that Article 53 ECHR, which gives Contracting Parties
the power to lay down higher standards of protection than those guaranteed by the
ECHR, should not compromise EU law. Although Article 53 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights appears to state something very similar to Article 53 ECHR, in
the 2013 Melloni judgment, the ECJ held that Member States could not have higher
standards than the EU Charter in cases where the EU has fully harmonized the
relevant law. Thus the ECJ asserted that the ECHR should be coordinated with (the
ECJ’s interpretation of) the Charter, and found that there was no provision in the
draft agreement to ensure such coordination.
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Second, the ECJ was concerned that the principle of mutual trust under EU law,
highly relevant in the context of the EU´s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,
could be undermined. Much EU legal co-operation within the AFSJ, such as, for
example, execution of European Arrest Warrants, is based on the presumption of
human rights compliance throughout the EU. In contrast, the ECHR would require
each Member State to check that other Member States had actually observed
fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust
between those Member States. The accession agreement contains no provision to
prevent such a development. In those circumstances, the Court of Justice believed
that accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the
autonomy of EU law.
Third, the Court noted that Protocol 16 ECHR (only signed on 2 October 2013)
allows ECHR states’ highest courts to seek advisory opinions from the ECtHR
regarding the interpretation and/or application of rights in the ECHR. Although the
EU will not accede to this Protocol, the ECJ nonetheless perceived it as a threat to
the autonomy of EU law, because ECHR states’ highest courts might prefer to make
a preliminary reference to Strasbourg on the compatibility of EU law with ECHR
rights, rather than to Luxembourg.
1. b) Article 344 TFEU
The ECJ has consistently held that an international agreement cannot affect the
allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties and, consequently, the autonomy of the
EU legal system. That principle is enshrined in Article 344 TFEU, which provides
that EU Member States may not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for
by the Treaties. Given that the draft agreement did not exclude the possible use of
the ECtHR to settle such disputes, the ECJ found that this undermined EU law.
1. c) The co-respondent mechanism
A large part of EU law is implemented by its Member States, and, therefore, it will
seem logical for the applicant to proceed against the State. Yet, Member States
often have no discretion as to whether, or how, an action emanating from the EU is
implemented. In such cases, the root of the problem lies with the EU measure, rather
than the Member State. Therefore, EU accession prompts tricky questions as to how
responsibility between the Member States and the EU should be split. In order to
address these problems, Article 3 of the draft accession agreement makes provision
for a co-respondent mechanism to be established. It provides that a Contracting
Party is to become a co-respondent either by accepting an invitation from the ECtHR
or by decision of the ECtHR upon the request of that Contracting Party. However,
carrying out such a review would require the ECtHR to assess the rules of EU law
governing the division of powers between the EU and its Member States. The Court
of Justice held that to permit the ECtHR to make such an assessment would risk
adversely affecting the division of powers between the EU and its Member States.
1. d) The procedure for the prior involvement of the Court of Justice
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Regard for autonomy of EU law requires that the CJEU must have had the chance
to interpret and rule on an issue of EU law before it reaches the ECtHR. The real
problem emerges with indirect actions concerning EU law brought in the courts of
the member states, and it is possible that, in such a case, a national court might
not refer to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling – in which case the CJEU would be
denied the ability to provide authoritative guidance on the treaties. A solution to this
problem was offered by Presidents Costa and Skouris in a joint communication,
which suggested that, as part of the accession agreement, an internal procedure
for indirect actions should be introduced, so that the CJEU should have a chance
to make a ruling in such cases. This idea was adopted by the draft accession
agreement (Article 3 (6)).
However, the ECJ found fault with the draft agreement’s terms, because, first, it did
not reserve to the CJEU only (ie it did not exclude the ECtHR) the power to rule on
whether the CJEU has already dealt with an issue, and, second, it did not permit the
CJEU to rule on the interpretation, but only on the validity, of EU law.
1. e) The specific characteristics of EU law as regards judicial review in CFSP
matters
Lastly, the Court analysed the specific characteristics of EU law as regards judicial
review in matters of the common foreign and security policy (‘CFSP’). The CJEU has
limited jurisdiction over CFSP acts, and so it is possible that it would have no chance
to interpret the EU law at issue prior to an ECtHR ruling in a case concerning the
human rights compatibility of a CFSP measure in Strasbourg. In such a situation,
the ECtHR would itself interpret EU law without the aid of the CJEU. This might
jeopardize the autonomy of Union law, and also the ECJ’s interpretative monopoly
under Article 344 TFEU. For example, if as a consequence of an EU military action,
a human rights violation were pleaded, it would appear that, post accession, an
action against the EU in the Strasbourg court would be feasible. Such a situation
would effectively entrust the exclusive judicial review, as regards compliance
with the rights guaranteed by the ECHR on the part of the EU, to a non-EU body.
Therefore, the ECJ held that the draft agreement failed to have regard to the specific
characteristics of EU law with regard to the judicial review of acts in the area of the
CFSP.
Reflections on the Opinion
This Opinion undoubtedly makes it difficult for the EU to proceed with accession. The
draft agreement was only achieved after tortuous negotiations and redrafts, mainly
– but not only – due to objections within the EU itself. The Court’s Opinion sets out
so many objections to accession, some requiring treaty change, that one is prompted
to think that the Court desired to make accession as difficult as possible. And this is
so, even given the Court’s somewhat privileged position as member of the Council
Committee that negotiated accession, and the fact that its suggestions, in both a
discussion document and a joint communication from the presidents of the ECtHR
and ECJ, appear to have been accommodated.
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The EU is required by the terms of its own Treaty, Article 6(2) TEU, to accede to
the ECHR, and the Commission is open to an infringement action if it fails to do
so. The history of EU integration provides many illustrations of ad hoc, pragmatic
actions in the face of seemingly impossible practical difficulties. So accession may
still be achieved. Nonetheless, the ECJ’s Opinion makes it highly problematic for the
Commission to proceed. There may indeed, be little prospect that non-EU ECHR
states will acquiesce in renegotiating the agreement to suit the terms of the ECJ’s
Opinion. In such a situation, the Commission could not be blamed if non-EU action
made it impossible to fulfil the obligation in Article 6(2).
What should our conclusions be if we value human rights? Peers characterizes
the Court’s Opinion as ‘a clear and present danger to human rights protection’ and
I believe he is right. The Court’s Opinion is shot through with statements on the
autonomy and special position of EU law, and most particularly with concern for
its own prerogatives as ultimate determinant of the EU legal order, rather than any
abiding concern with human rights. Thus the old critique that the ECJ does not take
rights seriously springs back to mind. As Leonard Besselink reminds us, we now
know that we must take seriously the ECJ President’s announcement at the FIDE
Conference 2014: ‘The Court is not a human rights court: it is the Supreme Court
of the Union.’ Indeed, there is something highly ironic in the ruling, in that the ECJ
appears to be opposing ECHR accession for fear this might result in a loss of its
sovereignty – a position uncannily similar to that taken by UK eurosceptics, who
desire ECHR membership only on their own terms.
This is indeed doubly ironic, for the Court expresses these concerns about its
constitutional position and autonomy of EU law, just at a time when, with the
expansion of EU criminal powers through the AFSJ, human rights control over
the EU has never been needed more. The ECHR has an important role to play in
underlining that the EU principles of mutual trust and recognition, although lynchpins
of European integration, must not threaten fundamental rights and subvert the very
values of the EU.
Yet, were the EU to accede to the ECHR, in full compliance with the Court’s
requirements in Opinion 2/13, human rights protection in the EU would not be
enhanced, for the EU would be shielded from many human rights claims, including
many, if not most, in the highly controversial CFSP and AFSJ areas. Given all of
the difficulties thrown out by the Court’s Opinion, Besselink has suggested that the
treaties should now be amended to insert the following ‘notwithstanding protocol’ to
read as follows:
‘The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notwithstanding Article 6(2) Treaty on European
Union, Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and
Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014.’
This is a dramatic suggestion indeed. But would all EU member states agree to such
a protocol? The UK’s present administration is unlikely to be very accommodating.
Therefore, I reluctantly conclude that, in the light of the ECJ Opinion, those who
value human rights no longer have any reason to pursue EU accession to the ECHR.
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Accession in compliance with the ECJ’s judgement would not provide effective
external control of the EU’s actions. This is a pessimistic conclusion, but it is hard to
conclude otherwise than that Opinion 2/13 does not take rights seriously.
This article is also published on the UK Constitutional Law Blog. 
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